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Abstract
This study extends earlier work identifying sequence order biases in contest outcomes
determined solely by popular voting. Results for different contest evaluation formats
are empirically scrutinised, where both expert panel scoring and popular voting deter-
mine contest ranking. Forms of sequence order bias exist separately in the expert panel
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the expert voting can be explained as a type of ‘grade inflation’.
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1 Introduction
Among other findings, Page and Page (2010) identify sequence order bias in the Idol televised
singing contest where rankings are determined by popular voting at the end of each contest
(episode). Later performing singers disproportionately gained higher popular vote shares,
which they define as a ‘recency’ bias. Further, they find evidence of a small ‘primacy’ effect
favouring the first performer.1 Both types of biases implicitly relate to memory given the
audience vote is after completion of each contest.
In principle, such sequence order effects should not feature in contests evaluated by expert
panel judgement scoring on criterion-based terms. Such bias should also be minimised be-
cause panel scoring takes place after each performance. Nevertheless, using data derived from
televised ‘live’ dance contest outcomes, we find evidence that there is sequential (J-curve)
bias in both judges’ evaluations and combined (television audience and judges) evaluations.
It is suggested that biases in judges’ evaluations are ‘non-designed’ and could emanate,
for example, from being influenced by close proximity to increasing studio audience acclaim
and euphoria as each contest (episode) moves to conclusion.2 In this sense, the sequential
bias observed in the judges’ scoring can be described as a type of ’grade inflation’. Even so,
we do observe some evidence that first contestants within an episode are generally stronger
performers, which could be the result of deliberate producer behaviour mindful of ratings
and potential channel switching by the television audience.
2 Data
Individual expert panel score data and combined popular poll and judge rankings for the UK
BBC television Strictly Come Dancing contest and the US spin-off on NBC called Dancing
with the Stars were collected from television station (BBC and NBC) websites and Wikipedia
pages. These contests pair a celebrity amateur dancer with a professional dancer. In the UK
contest the judges’ scores for each dancing couple are added together to give a total out of
40 (with four judges each able to give a maximum of 10 points for a given performance).
Once all couples have danced, they are ranked according to their total judges’ scores with
points awarded to each dance couple determined by their ranking. The number of points
awarded is based on the number of dancing couples remaining in the competition. If eight
1Additional evidence of primacy and recency effects can be found in, for example, Mantonakis et al.
(2009).
2A number of studies have considered crowd-based sources of bias entering sporting contests. Examples
include Dowie (1982), Nevill et al. (2002), and Lenten et al. (2018).
2
couples remain, the couple at the top of the leader board receive eight points, the second
seven points, etc.
Following this stage, it is open for the public to vote for their most preferred dancing
couple. Since 2016 they could vote both by phone or online. The points from the judges’
votes are then combined with points received via the public vote. Thus, if there were eight
couples left in the competition and a couple came top in the judges’ scoring and second in
the public vote they would have accumulated eight points plus seven points, making a total
of 15 points overall.
The public need to register a BBC account to vote online and may vote online (using
that account) up to three times in each contest (excluding the Grand Final). People can
also vote multiple times by phone. The lowest two scoring couples face a dance off where
one is eliminated based on the expressed preferences of the judges. The head judge has the
final deciding vote in the event of no unanimous decision by the other judges.
From Season 3 in the US spin-off, the voting system has been based on vote shares. The
judges’ vote share (the percentage of the total number of points awarded to all couples)
and the public vote share for each couple are added together. The couple with the lowest
combined total is eliminated from the show.
The BBC and NBC do not reveal the full popular vote data but only identify the lowest
(two) scoring dancing couples. In order to focus more clearly on sequence order effects we
examine only those episodes featuring one dance per couple. From the UK show, data was
based on 15 seasons (over the period 2004 to 2017) each with typically 8 to 10 usable (single
dance per couple) episodes. From the US show, data was extracted from 25 seasons over the
period 2005 to 2017 (typically based on two seasons per year unlike the UK comprising one
season per year) each with up to seven usable episodes.
3 Empirical analysis
Our first objective is to examine whether sequence order of contestants plays a role in
elimination outcomes within a given episode. We follow Page and Page (2010) and construct
a ‘bias’ variable based on the bottom two (or one for some of the US data) contestants
eliminated. Although we do not observe audience votes, we do observe the judges’ scores
that provide additional insight about sequence order effects. For comparative purposes, we
also construct a bias measure based only on the judges’ bottom score(s).
To construct the sequence order bias variable, we compare the observed frequency of
instances where a contestant featured in the bottom two (or one) positions against that
which would have occurred randomly vis-à-vis sequence order position. More formally, for a
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given episode with N (remaining) contestants and k ∈ {1, 2} achieving the lowest combined
or judges’ vote, we define the following measure of bias
E(Biass,k,N |s) =
∑
1(s = safe)
Tk,N
−
(
1− k
N
)
, (1)
where s is the sequence order within an episode and Tk,N is the total number of episodes of
type < k,N >. In this equation, the first term refers to the actual frequencies that each
sequence position is observed to be safe, while the second term reflects the theoretically
random probabilities.
Figure 1 provides preliminary evidence that a J-curve effect exists in both the UK and
US samples. Specifically, the first contestant in the sequence has either a positive (or small
negative) bias, followed by a series of negative biases for low order sequences, and positive
biases for contestants later in the sequence. Most notable, we observe a J-shape for both the
combined and judges’ scores, which suggests in addition to potential ‘primacy’ and ‘recency’
effects there is an additional sequence ordering bias arising from the judges’ scores.
Tables 1 and 2 present econometric specifications of this relationship, where the depen-
dent variable ‘bias’ is defined in Equation 1. Again, we follow Page and Page (2010) in
construction of these models and consider both fixed effects (FE) and random effects (RE)
specifications. As Page and Page (2010) describe in detail, the RE model is appropriate if
sequence ordering is random, whereas the FE model is appropriate if ordering is non-random
(e.g. producer imposed).
In all models there is supportive evidence of J-curve effects (i.e. positive ‘first’ and ‘order’
effects). Again, this is true for both the combined and judges’ votes.3 There is also evidence
that ‘order’ effects are stronger in the combined data, which suggests the audience strengthen
the J-curve effect. Although we do not observe this in the ‘bottom one’ US data, this does
not imply that there are no such effects, merely that thy do not induce additional sequence
biases. This would be the case if, for example, there was perfect correlation between the
judges’ scores and audience votes rankings.4
The parameter estimates across the FE and RE models are similar in both the UK and
US specifications. The Hausman test suggests that the RE model is correct for both the UK
and US data (with a single exception in one US specification). This suggests that ordering
is random and the RE model is appropriate, which is consistent with Page and Page (2010).
3We investigated whether removing the first two seasons of the US series influenced results in any manner
given the change in voting procedures but did not find differences in any result.
4Across all UK seasons, the correlation between final-place rank (based on combined scores) and average
dance score rank (based on judges’ scores) is 0.85. This correlation is 0.9 across all US seasons.
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More importantly, however, both models suggest the presences of the J-curve effect, which
exist after controlling for competitor abilities and interference in the allocation sequence.5
Given our data include judges’ scores for all contestants and episodes, we now undertake
an analysis based directly on these scores. We begin by examining non-parametric local
linear and quadratic specifications that relate average judge scores to the (relative) order.
Pooling the data over all seasons, Figure 2 clearly displays a J-shape for both the UK and
US data.
Model specifications examining ‘average judge score’ for the UK and US data are set out
in Tables 3 and 4, respectively. Models (1) to (4) employ OLS, whereas Models (5) to (8)
employ a (within) FE structure. Once again, in addition to the relative (sequence) ‘order’
variable, a dummy variable for being ‘first’ in the sequence of dances is included to investigate
a possible J-curve effect. Furthermore, quadratic specifications are also considered in this
respect. Sets of dummy variables control for season, week (within season), and dance style.6
OLS Models (2) and (3) suggest a J-curve effect in both the UK and US data. However,
the ‘first’ (in sequence) effect disappears in FE Models (6) and (7). This could be the result
of producers purposefully scheduling a ‘strong’ couple first in the show to give the episode
a strong and positive start. Essentially, once couple FEs are included, there is no ‘first’
effect.7 Furthermore, the quadratic models provide no evidence of quadratic effects for the
same reason accounting for the disappearing ‘first’ effect.8
That the ‘first’ effect is not present in the ‘average score’ models differs with the results
presented in the ‘bias’ models. This relates specifically to the different dependent variables
considered. In particular, while the first contestant might generally receive close to the
‘average’ score (after controlling for contestant fixed effects), they also rarely feature in
the bottom positions, which generates the (positive) ‘first’ effect (again after controlling for
contestant fixed effects).
Given the FE model controls for contestants’ abilities, the empirical evidence suggests in-
creasing scores from judges’ evaluating contestants later in the sequence. What is the source
of this bias? As contestants are scored after each dance, the memory-induced bias relating
to ‘recency’ should not factor. Furthermore, as the ‘bias’ models suggest no allocation bias
we do not believe this is producer induced. We are then left with a type of ‘grade inflation’,
which may relate to the euphoria of the contest combined with audience effects.
5Page and Page (2010) provide an eloquent synthesis of this process.
6In the UK data, 13 dance styles are categorised, and in the US data, 30 styles are categorised.
7In these models, we preference FE over RE given the wider set of explanatory variables included and
associated rejection of the Hausman test. We note that the parameter estimates from the RE specification
are very similar in qualitative terms.
8The FE models do not use seasonal effects as the within specification makes these redundant.
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4 Summary and concluding remarks
This study examines sequence order bias in a contest format featuring both expert panel
judgement and a popular vote. Contrary to expectations from expert panel outcomes as-
sessing on objective performance criteria (applied after each performance), the UK and US
data features clear evidence of sequence order bias effects. These effects resemble a J-curve
where there is both a ’first’ (in sequence) effect and ‘order’ effect, such that the first and
later performing contestants disproportionately gained higher expert panel scores.
Although we believe managed choice of opening performers may play a role, we suggest
that the key sequence biases observed can be interpreted as a type of ‘grade inflation’ in
the expert panel’s scoring. In particular, the ‘order’ effect may derive from studio audience
pressure akin to the previously cited evidence on spectator pressure on referees.
When popular votes augment the expert panel scores, the ‘primacy’ and ‘recency’ biases
observed in previous studies appear to reinforce and even amplify the J-curve effect. Our
results add to the evidence that creators of such contests should pay careful attention to
evaluation design given the various biases that may exist, including designs where they
might not be expected.
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Figure 1: Elimination bias vs. sequence order
−
.2
−
.1
0
.1
.2
A
v
e
ra
g
e
 B
ia
s
0 5 10 15
Order
UK Combined
−
.2
−
.1
0
.1
.2
A
v
e
ra
g
e
 B
ia
s
0 5 10 15
Order
UK Judges
−
.2
−
.1
0
.1
.2
A
v
e
ra
g
e
 B
ia
s
0 5 10 15
Order
US Combined (bottom two)
−
.2
−
.1
0
.1
.2
A
v
e
ra
g
e
 B
ia
s
0 5 10 15
Order
US Judges (bottom two)
−
.1
5−
.1
−
.0
5
0
.0
5
.1
A
v
e
ra
g
e
 B
ia
s
0 5 10 15
Order
US Combined (bottom one)
−
.1
5−
.1
−
.0
5
0
.0
5
.1
A
v
e
ra
g
e
 B
ia
s
0 5 10 15
Order
US Judges (bottom one)
7
Figure 2: Non-parametric and quadratic models of average score
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Table 1: UK regressions of bias on sequence
Combined Judges
FE RE FE RE
Order 0.379*** 0.384*** 0.188*** 0.196***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.008) (0.007)
First 0.266*** 0.269*** 0.219*** 0.225***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007)
Const. -0.237*** -0.240*** -0.106*** -0.112***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
Obs 1045 1045 1045 1045
Groups 199 199 199 199
R2 0.884 0.545
Hausman (p-value) 4.45 (0.11) 6.05 (0.05)
Notes: Dependent variable is ‘bias’. ‘Order’ is relative (sequence) order. ‘First’ is
dummy for first in sequence. FE and RE are fixed and random effects at couple
level, respectively. Week and Dance are sets of dummy fixed effects. Standard
errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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Table 3: UK regressions of average (judge) score on sequence
OLS Within FE
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Order 0.837*** 1.388*** 1.378*** -0.063*** 0.582*** 0.491*** 0.649*** 0.508***
(0.149) (0.172) (0.151) (0.250) (0.094) (0.115) (0.096) (0.145)
First 0.998*** 1.042*** -0.148 0.047
(0.162) (0.146) (0.106) (0.091)
Order sq 0.007*** 0.001
(0.002) (0.001)
Const. 6.455*** 6.049*** 5.075*** 5.994*** 6.595*** 6.661*** 6.172*** 6.220***
(0.092) (0.112) (0.313) (0.332) (0.058) (0.074) (0.129) (0.127)
Couple FE No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Season No No Yes Yes No No No No
Week No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Dance No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Obs 1276 1276 1276 1276 1276 1276 1276 1276
Groups 205 205 205 205
Adj. R2 0.024 0.051 0.285 0.265 -0.151 -0.150 0.227 0.228
LL -2347 -2328 -2130 -2147 -1548 -1547 -1280 -1280
Notes: Dependent variable is ‘average judge score’. ‘Order’ is relative (sequence) order. ‘First’ is dummy for first in sequence.
‘Order sq’ is squared relative order. Models (1)-(4) are OLS. Models (5)-(8) are within (couple) fixed effects. Season, Week,
and Dance are sets of dummy fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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Table 4: US regressions of average (judge) score on sequence
OLS Within FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Order 0.846*** 1.044*** 0.962*** 0.535** 0.661*** 0.605*** 0.603*** 1.128***
(0.118) (0.138) (0.118) (0.249) (0.091) (0.108) (0.087) (0.169)
First 0.364*** 0.308*** -0.094 -0.128
(0.132) (0.114) (0.098) (0.079)
Order sq 0.002 -0.004***
(0.002) (0.001)
Const. 6.922*** 6.776*** 6.080*** 6.357*** 7.024*** 7.064*** 6.150*** 6.036***
(0.074) (0.090) (0.485) (0.498) (0.055) (0.069) (0.289) (0.289)
Couple FE No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Season No No Yes Yes No No No No
Week No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Dance No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Obs 1349 1349 1349 1349 1349 1349 1349 1349
Groups 317 317 317 317
Adj. R2 0.036 0.041 0.320 0.317 -0.244 -0.245 0.220 0.224
LL -2215 -2211 -1948 -1951 -1473 -1472 -1136 -1132
Notes: Dependent variable is ‘average judge score’. ‘Order’ is relative (sequence) order. ‘First’ is dummy for first in sequence.
‘Order sq’ is squared relative order. Models (1)-(4) are OLS. Models (5)-(8) are within (couple) fixed effects. Season, Week,
and Dance are sets of dummy fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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